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Compare your pain when immersing your hand in freezing water and 
your pleasure when you taste your favourite wine.  The relationship 
seems obvious.  Your pain experience is unpleasant, aversive, negative, 
and bad.  Your experience of the wine is pleasant, attractive, positive, and 
good.  Pain and pleasure are straightforwardly opposites.  Or that, at any 
rate, can seem beyond doubt, and to leave little more to be said.  But, in 
fact, it is not beyond doubt.  And, true or false, it leaves a good deal more 
to be said:  about the nature of sensory affect; its relations to perception, 
motivation, and rationality; its value; and the mechanisms underlying it.  
Much is said about these matters in the contributions that follow.  Here in 
this introductory essay, we map the dialectical landscape and locate our 
contributors’ papers within it. 
  
1.  Terminology and Sensory Affect 
 
Like many (but not all) our contributors, we focus on sensory affect.  Hence 
we use “pleasure” narrowly, to refer to sensory pleasure, and eschew its 
broader use, which encompasses such arguably non-sensory pleasures as 
joy, delight, and happiness.  Identifying pleasures as sensory is not 
straightforward.  Consider the strawberry farmer who dislikes the taste of 
ripe strawberries yet takes pleasure in eating one of her own because she 
knows that the ripe taste means her crop is ready to harvest.1  Is this a case 
of sensory pleasure?  We shall take it to be so only if her sensory 
experience—for example the gustatory cum olfactory cum tactile 
                                                          
1 The example is Aydede’s (this volume). 
experience of tasting the strawberry—is itself pleasant, hence not if her 
only pleasant state is her happiness that her crop is ready to harvest.  How 
to categorise a given case will often be difficult, not least because of top-
down modulation: the farmer’s appreciation of the significance of the taste 
might affect her gustatory experience, rendering it pleasant.  There are also 
difficult questions about how to individuate experiences and other mental 
states, and how to apportion pleasantness among them.  Still, for our 
purposes, it suffices to say that our focus is on the pleasantness of sensory 
experiences. 
 Turning to “pain”, it too has broader and narrower uses.  We use 
it, narrowly, to refer to so-called physical pains, experiences in which a 
subject has—or seems to have—pains in a part of her own body, for 
example in her hand, immersed in freezing water.  We therefore eschew 
its broader use, on which it refers to all states of suffering, not only those 
involving physical pain but also grief, depression, anxiety and so forth. 
Our focus on the negative side of sensory affect extends beyond 
pain, however, to all unpleasant sensory experiences.  We’ll call these 
unpleasures.  This category includes not only pains, notice, and arguably 
not all pains.  Take the latter point first.  It is often claimed that pain 
processing involves two neural pathways (Price 2000; see also Shriver, this 
volume).  When you are jabbed with a pin, one of these pathways 
underlies the experience’s unpleasantness, the other underlies further, 
sensory aspects of the experience’s phenomenology.  Hence many take 
typical, unpleasant pain experiences to comprise dissociable components:  
a neutral, sensory component, and a “hedomotive” component, the latter 
contributing the experience’s unpleasantness and motivational force.  In 
rare cases, it is argued, the sensory component might be present while the 
hedomotive component is absent, the subject thus undergoing an 
experience with all of a pain’s other properties but not its unpleasantness.  
Whether we should call such experiences pains arguably calls for decision 
rather than discovery, although it notable that those with the rare 
condition pain asymbolia seem to.  Pain asymbolics say they do not mind 
the experiences elicited by such noxious stimuli as pinches and pin 
pricks—and they do not grimace or withdraw, indeed sometimes they 
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smile—yet, unlike pain insensitives, they still describe the experiences as 
pains (Berthier et al 1988; Grahek 2007; Bain: forthcoming).  Anyway, 
whether or not there are non-unpleasant pains, there are certainly 
unpleasant non-pains, including for most people severe itches, and 
gustatory and olfactory experience of rotten meat.  Again, we will call 
such experiences, together with typical pains, unpleasures.2 
In sum, our focus in this introduction is sensory affect:  that is, 
pleasure and unpleasure.  
   
2.  Hedonic Space and Masochism 
 
What questions does reflection on sensory affect generate?  Some 
questions concern the mapping of hedonic space.  Are pleasure and 
unpleasure opposites?  Does every pleasure and unpleasure lie at a point 
on a single dimension, running towards ever more intense pleasure in one 
direction, and ever more intense unpleasure in the other?  Or do they lie 
on orthogonal dimensions?  If the former, does pleasure shade directly 
into unpleasure, or are there affectively neutral experiences lying between 
pleasures and unpleasures?  Is either pleasure or unpleasure our natural 
or default state, unnoticed or absent only to the extent that the other state 
masks or eliminates it?  These questions are relevant not only to those, like 
Olivier Massin in this volume, who are delineating metaphysical space.  
They also intersect with questions about the nature of pleasure, 
unpleasure, and pain; the mechanisms underlying them; and the challenge 
of making sense of some difficult—perhaps paradoxical—cases such as 
masochism.   
 Whether pleasantness and unpleasantness are opposites can be 
read as the question whether they are contraries, in the sense of properties 
it is impossible for a single experience to co-instantiate at a time.  A single 
object cannot, at a time, be both red all over and green all over; but it can, 
                                                          
2 Note that we are using “pleasures” and “unpleasures” to refer to experiences, not 
their objects, hence to the gustatory experience of ice-cream, not to the ice-cream or 
its taste. 
at a time, be both red and cuboid.  Which of these is the better model for 
pleasure and unpleasure?   
Against the intuition that pleasure and unpleasure are contraries 
stand cases of so-called mixed feelings, cases in which a single subject 
appears to have an experience that is, at a time, both pleasant and 
unpleasant.  Consider, for example, people who enjoy being whipped in 
certain sexual contexts.  Even if we deny this case involves 
unpleasantness, it can seem puzzling, given the following worry: 
 
A.  Masochism seems to involve non-unpleasant pains.  But this 
can’t be, since pains are unpleasant by definition. 
 
But there are various things we can do to evade this worry:  invoke such 
inhibitory mechanisms as the Melzack-Wall gate, for example, to say of 
masochists what is often said of injured soldiers in the heat of battle, 
namely that they are not undergoing even the neutral, sensory component 
of ordinary pain experiences, hence are not in pain (Pitcher 1970a); or, 
even if the sensory component is present, refuse to count the experience a 
pain given the absence of unpleasantness; or, encouraged by the case of 
pain asymbolia,  deny that non-unpleasant pain is an incoherent idea; or, 
finally, insist that masochists’ pains are unpleasant. 
This final point strikes many as correct.  Masochists’ experiences 
of their whippings do seem unpleasant; those who seek them say as much.  
Yet they also seem pleasant, hence to be cases of mixed feelings.  This 
generates further puzzles.  To see these, start with an unproblematic case 
of a person’s tolerating something unpleasant as an unwanted side-effect 
of something desired, or of a means to something desired, for example 
someone with sensitive teeth tolerating the pain of eating ice-cream for the 
pleasure of the taste.  But now notice that sexual masochism looks quite 
different from this case, as do less esoteric, non-sexual cases of masochism 
such as the enjoyment of curries that are so spicy they are painful to eat.  
In these cases, the unpleasure seems somehow part of the pleasure, which 
is puzzling for at least two reasons: 
 
3 
 
B.  In certain contexts, masochists seem to seek (want, like) 
unpleasure.  How can this be? 
 
C.  In certain contexts, masochists seem to have experiences that 
are both pleasant and unpleasant at a time.  How can this be? 
 
This last worry arises, of course, from the idea that pleasure and 
unpleasure are contraries.  Hence a straightforward way to deal with it is 
to jettison that idea.  But there are also strategies that retain contrariety, 
and these may anyway be needed to address (B). 
 One such strategy is to appeal to the possibility of agents 
pursuing unpleasant means to pleasurable ends.  For while (contra the ice-
cream model) masochism does not involve tolerating the unpleasure as a 
side-effect of a means to pleasure, it might yet involve tolerating and even 
pursuing the unpleasure as itself a means to pleasure.  On one such story, 
for instance, what masochists find pleasurable is the make-believe that 
they are so subordinate to their master or mistress that he or she is willing 
and able to make them suffer regardless of their wishes; and masochists seek 
the unpleasantness of the whipping merely as a means to this ersatz 
belief—a means to the suspension of disbelief, if you like, to which end 
safety words and masochistic paraphernalia also contribute.  Such an 
account, however, might seem to miss the kinship between different cases:  
sexual masochism, the curry case, and the desire to watch scary films, for 
example.  (The alternative account Colin Klein offers in this volume is 
designed precisely to capture this kinship.)  Another worry about the 
suspension-of-disbelief account, invoking as it does the pleasure only of a 
belief, or an ersatz belief, is that it fails to accommodate the sensory 
pleasure involved in sexual masochism and the other cases.   
 What might throw some light on the sensory pleasure of 
masochism is an understanding of the complex interactions that 
psychologists and neuroscientists are currently uncovering among 
pleasure, unpleasure, threat, and our expectations.  Unpleasant pain can 
produce endorphins, for example, which can in turn generate a sense of 
euphoria (see Klein, this volume).  Threat and danger can also produce 
sexual arousal quite beyond the usual context of sexual masochism, as 
shown in an experiment in which subjects were required simply to walk 
across a high, rickety bridge (Dutton and Aron 1974; see also Klein, this 
volume).  Pain, moreover, enhances our attention not only to pain-causing 
stimuli but also to pleasure-causing stimuli, increasing the intensity and 
enhancing the processing of all sensory signals, not only those subserving 
pain.  Subjects in one study, in pain through immersing their hands in 
freezing water (the cold pressor test), were better able to distinguish 
among similar flavours; and they experienced tastes as more pleasurable 
(Bastion et al:  in press).3   Pleasant foods and drinks, furthermore, taste 
better when relieving the unpleasant experiences of hunger and thirst 
(Cabanac 1979; Kringlebach 2004; see also Bastian and Leknes, this 
volume). 
Relief from pain is particularly interesting in this context.   
Studies indicate that relief involves not only a reduction in pain; it 
involves pleasure (see Bastian and Leknes, and Hardcastle, this volume).  
Indeed, relief even from the threat of pain produces pleasure (Leknes et al 
2011).   We asked earlier whether either pain or pleasure is our default 
state, unnoticed or absent only to the extent that it is masked or eliminated 
by the other state.  One recent explanation of the pleasure of relief, the 
opponent-processing account, invokes what might be thought to be a 
neural corollary of this idea of “masking”.  It says that, as part of a drive 
towards homeostatic balance, the neural process underlying an unpleasant 
experience will generate an opposing, positively valenced process which, 
when the unpleasant experience ceases abruptly, results in pleasure 
(Leknes et al 2008; Leknes and Tracey 2010).  
While care is needed accurately to characterise such empirical 
evidence, and to tease out its exact bearing on the putative contrariety of 
pleasure and unpleasure—and the puzzling cases of sexual masochism, 
curry-eating, and the rest—it looks highly likely that the mechanisms at 
which we’ve gestured will illuminate at least some of the phenomena. 
                                                          
3 Hence the ice-cream case described above is potentially more complex than 
described.  
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3.  Theories of Pain and Unpleasantness 
 
3.1.  Putative Desiderata:  Non-Phenomenality, Motivation, and 
Normativity 
In virtue of what is an experience pleasant or unpleasant?  What 
constitutes its pleasantness or unpleasantness?  Various accounts have 
been advanced but there is little agreement even about the desiderata to 
be met.  While hotly contested, three putative requirements are worth 
elaborating.  Call them:  Non-Phenomenality, Motivation, and 
Normativity 
 First, Non-Phenomenality.  Many have denied that there is any 
introspectively discoverable “quality” that integrates the class of pleasures 
or unpleasures (Sidgwick 1907; Feldman 1997; see also Aydede, this 
volume).  Suppose that you are fortunate enough to have packed into the 
previous minute the pleasures of feeling a tender caress, of tasting 
chocolate ice cream, and of smelling your favourite rose.  Introspect on 
these experiences and you will find, it is said, no phenomenal quality—no 
aspect of “what it is like” to undergo them—in virtue of which they are all 
pleasant.  What is denied is not that these experiences’ phenomenal 
characters are pleasant, but that they share a phenomenal feature that is 
their pleasantness. And the same, mutatis mutandis, is often said in the case 
of pains and other unpleasures.  
 Turning to Motivation, consider the unpleasant pain you have 
when your hand is immersed in freezing water.  It defeasibly motivates 
you to withdraw your hand, “defeasibly” because the motivation might be 
overridden by a stronger motivation to (say) prove to us how tough you 
are.    This motivational character, the idea goes, is inherent in the pain’s 
unpleasantness—in the sense that it is independent of (further) desires.4  
Unpleasant pains, some will further argue, belong to a special category of 
motivations, namely motivations that figure in rationalising explanations of 
action.  When we explain your withdrawing your hand from the freezing 
water in terms of the unpleasantness of your pain, the idea goes, we are 
                                                          
4 “Further” is required if one thinks pains are desires.  See Bain 2013. 
not merely giving a reason that your body moved—as the fullness of 
Vesuvius’s magma chamber was a reason that it erupted—but are also 
giving a reason for which you moved it, a mental episode in light of which 
that action seemed reasonable to you, thus moving you to perform it.  And 
here too some will want to extend the claim, mutatis mutandis, to the rest 
of sensory affect:  pleasures, that is, and also the other unpleasures. 
 Finally, Normativity.  Applied to pain, the idea is that unpleasant 
pains—whether or not they are motivational—are in fact good reasons to 
act.  Even if, on a particular occasion, you know your body is neither 
damaged nor even at risk of damage, you have a good reason to end your 
unpleasant pain.5  For, the idea goes, it is bad to undergo an unpleasant 
pain (defeasibly, of course, since an unpleasant pain might also have very 
good consequences).  That is why it is wrong gratuitously to cause 
someone else to undergo unpleasant pain.  And again, many will extend 
the thought, saying it is bad to undergo other unpleasures too, and 
conversely good to experience pleasure. 
 
3.2.  Perceptualism about Pain 
We might well contest Non-Phenomenality, Motivation, and Normativity.  
But suppose for now that we don’t.  What bearing have they on accounts 
of pain?  (We will return in §4 to pleasures and the other unpleasures.)  
Well, they can seem to make trouble for those who model pain 
experiences on perceptual experiences.  One such model invokes sense-
data, saying that having a pain at the end of your nose consists in being 
acquainted with an awareness-dependent, mental object, namely a pain, 
literally located in the end of your nose.  Another is to embrace a kind of 
adverbialism and say that the situation rather consists in your sensing 
your nose painfully (Aune 1967; Tye 1984; and Aydede, this volume).  But 
the perceptual model that has dominated philosophers’ theorising about 
pain since the 1960s—call it perceptualism—instead invokes 
                                                          
5 Note that unpleasant pains might also present further good reasons to act, e.g. 
presenting certain bodily states as bad, thereby motivating actions aimed at 
eliminating those bodily states (Bain 2013). 
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representational content (hereafter, just “content”).  For perceptualists, just 
as its visually seeming to you as though a red cube is before you consists 
in your undergoing an experience that represents to you that a red cube is 
before you, your being in pain consists in your undergoing an experience 
representing to you that a part of your body is damaged (on one version of 
the view, on which we’ll focus) or undergoing some kind of “disturbance” 
(on another).6  It is not that pain is a sign from which damage might be 
inferred, as spots are a sign from which measles might be inferred, but that 
pain informs subjects of damage in a way comparable to that in which 
visual experiences inform subjects of the shape and colour of things in 
their environment.  While pain experiences are not beliefs, on most 
versions of this view, they do have truth-conditions, being true (or 
veridical) if the represented bodily location really is damaged, and false 
(or illusory) if it is not (as in cases of referred pain). 
 Perceptualism can seem attractive.  It enables a promising 
account of our talk of the location of pains according to which the 
difference between, on the one hand, phantom-limb and other cases in 
which we say that a subject is merely in pain and, on the other hand, cases 
in which we additionally say that the subject has a pain in a body part is as 
follows:  the former involve her merely seeming to somatosensorily 
perceive a body part as damaged, the latter involve her actually doing so, 
whether accurately or not (Bain 2007).  Perceptualism also dovetails with 
representationalist accounts of phenomenal consciousness (Tye 1996; 
Byrne 2001).  These say that an experience’s phenomenal character is or 
supervenes on its content.  What it is for a visual experience to be, for 
instance, “red-feeling” (as it’s sometimes put) is a matter of the 
experience’s representing to you that there is something red in your 
environment.  For adherents of this view, the phenomenology of pains 
would be an embarrassing excrescence if pains were, contra 
perceptualism, representationally blank (as many philosophers have 
assumed). 
                                                          
6 See Armstrong 1962 and 1968; Pitcher 1970b; Tye 1995; and Bain 2003. 
 But, for all its attractions, perceptualism can seem ill placed to 
accommodate the three putative desiderata:  Non-Phenomenality, 
Motivation, and Normativity.  For these might seem precisely to register 
respects in which pain experiences differ from the visual experiences that 
some perceptualists take as their model.  By explaining unpleasant pains’ 
phenomenal character in terms of content, the worry goes, perceptualism 
risks missing pains’ crucial differences from visual experiences,7 missing 
in particular the non-phenomenal aspect in virtue of which pains are 
motivational and normative, namely their unpleasantness.  Some may 
reply that visual experiences too can be motivating, perhaps even 
unpleasant.  But that misses the thrust of the point:  that just as Hume 
denied that beliefs can by themselves motivate (Hume 1739; Bricke 1996), 
we should deny that the possession of indicative content by an 
experience—whether a visual experience or a pain—suffices for it to be 
unpleasant or motivational.8  
 
3.3. Desire and Functionalist Views of Pain’s Unpleasantness 
But how else might we illuminate pain’s unpleasantness and its 
motivational, normative character?  Instead of invoking perceptual 
content, numerous philosophers invoke desires, in particular experience-
directed desires.  The orthodoxy has it that a pain’s unpleasantness 
consists in the subject having what we might call a termination- or t-
desire, that is a non-instrumental desire for that pain immediately to 
cease.9  “Non-instrumental” is important.  On this view, the desire for a 
given experience to cease so that you might better concentrate, say, would not 
render it unpleasant; but an experience for the experience to cease for no 
further end would.  And it would render it unpleasant, notice, not because 
it would causally affect—or “modulate”—the experience’s content or 
                                                          
7 For another version of this worry, centring on “interiority” rather than 
Motivationality or Normativity, see Bain 2003. 
8 For more on this worry and the parallels with metaethics, see Bain 2013.  
9 See Armstrong 1962 and 1968, Pitcher 1970b, Tye 1995, and—for more 
references—Bain 2013. 
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character, but rather because an experience simply counts as unpleasant by 
dint of being the target of such a desire, rather as Fred counts as the 
shortest by dint of being shorter than everyone else. Notice that, as an 
account of pain’s unpleasantness, rather than of pain per se, this view can 
(though it needn’t) be advanced as a way of saving perceptualism:  
perceptualists are right about what pains are, the idea goes, but desires are 
needed to explain what it is for them to be unpleasant (Armstrong 1962). 
Whether in the service of perceptualism or not, making desires 
components of unpleasant pains can seem a good way of doing justice to 
Non-Phenomenality, Motivation, and Normativity.  After all, desire 
theorists can allow that unpleasant pains are phenomenally diverse, since 
they think pains count as unpleasant in virtue not of some shared 
phenomenal character, but of their being t-desired.  Moreover, that 
unpleasant pains are inherently motivational and, further, bad states to be 
in is explained by their incorporating t-desires that are, further, 
unsatisfied. 
 The desire view remains popular and has important variants, 
some invoking episodes of disliking pains rather than t-desiring pains.10  
But some reject it.  The commonest complaint is that the desire view gets 
the order of explanation wrong:  a person wants her unpleasant pains to 
end because they are unpleasant, hence it cannot also be that they are 
unpleasant because she wants them to end.  (See Cohen and Fulkerson, 
this volume, for a reply.)  Others argue that the desire view fails to meet 
the desiderata above, questioning for example whether desires—
construed as some construe them—can rationalise in the sense we sketched 
earlier.  Yet others don’t accept all the desiderata, for example those 
who—returning from the introspective coal face with quite different 
findings from their opponents, as philosophers are wont to do—reject 
non-phenomenality and insist it is just obvious that pain’s unpleasantness 
is a phenomenal matter after all. 
                                                          
10  For criticism of one dislike view, see Bain 2013.  Note that some take the notions 
of t-desiring and disliking to be interchangeable (see Bain 2013). 
 It is worth flagging here Murat Aydede’s attempt to split the 
difference between accounts that claim and accounts that deny that 
pleasantness and unpleasantness are phenomenal properties.  Arguing 
that the pleasantness of an experience consists not in an experience-
directed desire, but rather in the experience’s desire-like functional role, 
Aydede concludes that pleasantness is a phenomenal but not a sensory 
feature of an experience.  Again, while phenomenal, pleasantness and 
unpleasantness are not “sensory qualia”, Aydede argues, since they lack 
the appropriate correspondence to the tastes, smells, textures and other 
sensible properties that the experiences they characterise represent.  
  
3.4. Special Content Views of Pain’s Unpleasantness 
The worry presented in §3.2 was that a pain experience’s possession of 
indicative content could not account for its motivational and normative 
characteristics.  Desire theorists respond by invoking desires.  Aydede 
invoke desire-like functional roles.  But others think the worry can be met 
by invoking special contents.  Granted not all experiential contents make 
their bearers motivational and bad states to be in, nevertheless some 
special contents do.  Or so it is claimed.  But how are the relevant contents 
special?  Recent attention has focused on two proposals. 
On the first, unpleasant pains’ contents are special because of a 
feature corresponding to a sentence’s grammatical mood.  Whereas some 
contents—visual contents, perhaps—are indicative, the contents that 
render pains unpleasant are imperative (Klein 2007; Hall 2008; Martínez 
2011).  Pains don’t inform, or on some versions don’t only inform; rather, 
they command.  In particular, on one such approach, a pain might consist 
in your “pain module” telling you to stop immersing your hand in 
freezing water.  Imperativism is an increasingly popular view, being 
developed by various philosophers in intriguing ways.  But it also has its 
critics.  Some worry that there is no command that all and only pains can 
plausibly be taken to incorporate (Tumulty 2009; Bain 2011), others that 
commands—unlike unpleasant pains—are incapable of rationalising the 
actions they prompt (Bain 2013). 
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 An alternative view says that unpleasant pains’ contents are 
special not because they are imperative, but because they are evaluative.  
According to evaluativism, while an unpleasant pain of yours might also 
have non-evaluative content—which content might persist in a case of 
pain asymbolia—your pain is unpleasant and motivates in virtue of 
representing (correctly or incorrectly) that a part of your body is in a bad 
state (Helm 2002; Cutter and Tye 2011; Bain 2013).  Some evaluativists 
think this position is required to make sense of unpleasant pain’s 
rationalising role (Helm 2002; Bain 2013).  Opponents disagree.  Some 
deny that unpleasant pains rationalise; others—including Cohen and 
Fulkerson in this volume—think it has not be shown that evaluative 
content is needed in order for them to do so.  Yet others find the very 
notion of an experience having evaluative content murky, denying that we 
have an account—or at least a naturalistic account—of what an 
experience’s possessing such content would involve (for a reply, see 
Cutter and Tye 2011). 
 
4.  Pleasure, Unpleasure, and Pain:  Symmetries and Asymmetries 
 
Having looked at unpleasant pain in §3.2-3.4, let us broaden our focus 
again and consider the symmetries and asymmetries among pleasure, 
unpleasure, and pain. 
  
4.1.  A Further Contrast between Pain and Pleasure/Unpleasure 
At the outset we noted that not all unpleasures are pains.  But notice a 
further point:  whereas unpleasantness and pleasantness seem in some 
measure to span the sense modalities, pain does not.  Your tactile 
experience of someone touching you and your gustatory experience of a 
taste may both be unpleasant or pleasant.  But again, pain seems not to 
span the modalities in this way. 
If right, this might be taken to indicate that pain is itself a sense 
modality, to which pain experiences—unpleasant or not—belong.11  The 
                                                          
11 Perceptualism, as characterised in §4, is not committed to this claim. 
idea of pain as its own sense modality once seemed more outré than it 
does now.  For whereas in the pain case there were no obvious sense 
organs (contrast eyes in the case of vision) and no obvious, well-defined 
kind of stimulus to which any such organ might be sensitive (contrast 
light in the case of vision), some think that the discovery of nociceptors 
has supplied the relevant sense organs, which—they claim—respond to 
damage or the threat of damage or perhaps to some other kind of 
“disturbance”. 
Whether pain is a sense modality or not is still a live issue; and 
settling it will depend on settling the criteria by which sense modalities 
ought to be individuated (Macpherson 2011).  We will not pursue the 
matter further except to register another possibility, articulated in this 
volume by Richard Gray.  According to Gray, while pain is not itself a 
modality, and does not respond to physical stimulations of one particular 
kind, it is nonetheless related to perception, since pains—he argues—
represent the significance for us of the excessive stimulation of the sense 
organs of the modalities.  In any case, pleasantness and unpleasantness 
seem to be (as Gray acknowledges) a different case again.  They are 
features possessed by experiences across a range of sense modalities 
(including pain experiences, whatever modality pain experiences belong 
to).  There is, again, no basis on which to call either pleasure or unpleasure 
themselves sense modalities. 
 
4.2.  Symmetries:  Extending Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness 
Since the accounts we examined in §§3.3-3.4 were not of pain per se, but of 
its unpleasantness, we should ask whether they might be extended to 
illuminate pleasure, on the one hand, and the remaining unpleasures, on 
the other. 
Some of those accounts’ adherents do indeed try to extend them.  
Some desire theorists, for example, say that just as pain experiences count 
as unpleasant by being the targets of t-desires, so do itch experiences 
(Armstrong 1962).  And, turning to pleasure, they claim that an experience 
of a caress counts as pleasant by, conversely, being the target of a “c-
desire”, that is a non-instrumental desire for the experience to continue.  
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Can the special content views be similarly extended?  What, for example, 
do imperativists say about the non-pain unpleasures?  About itch (a type 
of experience to which imperativism was applied before pain) 
imperativists have said that the experience is not a command for the 
subject to stop what he is doing, but rather a command for him to scratch 
(Hall 2008).12  Turning to pleasure, while imperativists have so far said 
little on this score, one can imagine what they might say:  if unpleasant 
pains command one to stop doing what one is doing, or alternatively to 
stop the perceived bodily disturbance, then perhaps pleasures command 
one to continue doing what one is doing, or to sustain some perceived 
event or condition.  Given this, masochism might threaten imperativism to 
the extent that it would seem to require an experience that commands the 
subject both to stop and to continue.  But perhaps such ambivalent 
commands are possible; and anyway, if Klein can successfully defend the 
alternative account of masochism that he offers in this volume, then 
imperativists may not need to invoke them.  As for evaluativists, they—
like imperativists—have said less about pleasure than pain, but the 
obvious elaboration of their view is that, if unpleasures represent certain 
conditions as bad, pleasures represent them as good.  It remains to be seen 
whether these extensions of accounts of pain’s unpleasantness are 
defensible.   
 
4.3.  Asymmetries and Motivation 
Having glimpsed how accounts of pain’s unpleasantness might be 
extended, it is important to note that we must not simply assume that they 
should be.  We must not, that is, assume that whatever is said about 
unpleasantness should simply be inverted and said about pleasantness; or 
                                                          
12 One challenge this presents for imperativism is to ensure that the command to 
scratch—at least partly constitutive of unpleasant itches—and the command to stop 
what one is doing—at least partly constitutive of unpleasant pains—have 
something in common in virtue of which both of itches and pains count as 
unpleasant.  Although see §5.3 below. 
that whatever is said about pain’s unpleasantness should be said about 
unpleasantness in general. 
 Starting with the latter point, notice that we often call pains not 
just unpleasant but painful.  Why do we ascribe painfulness only to pains 
and not to other unpleasures, for example itches or nausea?13  It could be 
that talking of painful experiences is simply another way of talking of 
pains, or of pains that are unpleasant—unpleasant in some generic way, that 
is, no different in kind from the unpleasantness of other unpleasures.  But, 
alternatively, it could be that “painful” is a word for a distinctive kind of 
unpleasantness or aversiveness that only pains have.  If so, it would be 
mistaken simply to carry over to the other unpleasures an account of 
pain’s unpleasantness, or simply to invert that account to get a story about 
pleasantness.  In short, whatever the meaning of “painful”, we must ask:  
Is pain’s unpleasantness distinctive vis-à-vis the unpleasantness of other 
unpleasures?  Is pain’s unpleasantness asymmetric vis-à-vis pleasure?  And 
is unpleasantness in general asymmetric vis-à-vis pleasure? 
 Myriad positions on these matters are possible.  Some, for 
instance, might think that pain’s unpleasantness—not just pain itself—is 
phenomenally different from the unpleasantness of other unpleasures.  
Some will argue for normative asymmetries between the positive and 
negative cases:  claiming, for instance, that there is greater moral 
justification (all else equal) for eliminating a person’s unpleasant pain (or 
unpleasure generally) than for increasing his pleasure (Hurka 2011; and 
Shriver, this volume).   Another claim in this area is that the 
unpleasantness of pain occupies subjects’ attention in a way that the 
pleasantness of pleasures does not (see, in this volume, Gray and Shriver).   
 A particularly important dispute falling under this head relates 
to Motivation (§3.1).  On the basis of experiments on rats, neuroscientist 
Kent Berridge argues that—in his terms—“liking” and “wanting” 
dissociate (Berridge 2009).   While care is required to interpret Berridge 
and his data, not least given his definition of “liking” and “wanting”, 
some are tempted to take him to have shown that it is possible for a 
                                                          
13 A question Jennifer Corns has impressed on us. 
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subject to have a pleasant experience without the pleasure motivating her 
(even defeasibly) to get more of it or its cause—to show, for example, that 
she might have a pleasurable gustatory experience of an expensive wine 
and yet that pleasure not even slightly incline her to taste more even when 
she lacks any opposing motivation (for example, a desire to stay sober or 
to save money).  Suppose that is right.  Is a parallel dissociation possible in 
the case of unpleasantness and motivation?  Jennifer Corns argues that it 
probably is.14  If successful, her argument seems to undermine Motivation 
as characterised in §3.1.  But Shriver (this volume) rejects this dissociation.  
He claims that while one can indeed find an experience pleasant without 
the pleasure even defeasibly motivating one to have more of it or its cause, 
one cannot find an experience unpleasant without the unpleasantness 
defeasibly motivating one to end it or its cause.  If Shriver is right, a further 
asymmetry between pleasure and unpleasure opens up.   
 
5.  Synopses 
 
The papers in this special issue address many of the questions above.  In 
this final section, we provide brief synopses. 
 Defining “contraries” as incompatible properties that have the 
same category of bearers, Olivier Massin’s paper, ‘Pleasure and its 
contraries’, denies that pain is the contrary of pleasure, since he claims 
that pain and pleasure belong to different categories.  Instead, he suggests, 
pleasure has two contraries: unpleasure (which he calls pleasure’s ‘polar 
opposite’; see also §2 above) and hedonic indifference or ‘indolence’ 
(pleasure’s ‘neutral opposite’).  (Massin helpfully disentangles various 
relations:  for example contrariety, contradiction, and opposition.  See also 
§§1-2 above.)  Against Plato, moreover, Massin argues that the 
contradictory of pleasure does not comprise a natural class, since the non-
                                                          
14 Corns: forthcoming.  See also Cohen and Fulkerson, this volume.  Corns’ 
principal claim concerns a dissociation at the sub-personal, computational level, but 
she thinks it also likely that the personal level dissociation mentioned in the text 
holds.  
pleasures include not only unpleasures but states of “hedonic 
indifference”.  To understand the neutrality of these states of indifference, 
Massin considers two competing models:  zero degrees centigrade, which 
is a temperature, and zero kilograms, which by contrast is not a weight, 
but weightlessness.  Massin claims that the former is the more appropriate 
model, since hedonic neutrality (or indolence) is itself, he argues, an 
hedonic property. 
 Colin Klein’s contribution focuses on a central issue in §2 above, 
mentioned also by Massin and Leknes and Bastian:  how to make sense of 
masochistic pleasures, experiences that people find pleasant because they 
are painful or unpleasant.  Klein argues that these experiences are not 
limited to sex or psychopathology, but include, for example, eating hot 
food or running a marathon.  Typical attempts to make sense of these 
experiences, he argues, fail to capture the kinship among such disparate 
cases.  Klein’s own view is that in masochistic pleasures what is found 
pleasant is the experience’s ‘penumbral quality’, that is, the awareness that 
the painfulness of the experience is on the very limit of bearability.  
Pleasurable pains are thus penumbral sensations.  Thus Klein answers the 
question of what is pleasurable in masochistic pleasures.  As for how they 
are possible, his account appeals to the following hierarchy:  pain is a first-
order mental state, but painfulness and pleasantness are higher-order states.  
The structure of masochistic pleasure, then, involves a first-order 
experience, for example a pain, being felt as painful, which painfulness is 
in turn (and because of its penumbral quality) felt as pleasant. 
 Siri Leknes and Brock Bastian’s paper, ‘The benefits of pain’, 
focuses on matters also addressed in other papers in the volume, for 
example the idea that pain gives us reason to act by dint of its affective 
nature, and the idea that certain pains can in fact be pleasurable.  But their 
principal claim, supported by empirical data, is that pain has many 
potential benefits, many of them concerning pleasure.  Pain can, they 
argue, (i) give you a sense of accomplishment when re-conceptualised as a 
challenge, (ii) allow the subject to demonstrate positive qualities of 
strength, determination, and self-control, (iii) provide the possibility for 
atonement and redemption after transgression, (iv) motivate the 
10 
 
accumulation of social resources, such as social bonds and support, which 
help to strengthen our defence systems against future pain, (v) direct 
attention to bodily stimuli and thereby enhance pleasure, (vi) give rise to 
the pleasure of relief when pain subsides, and (vii) inhibit other painful 
and unpleasant experiences.  
Turning to Valerie Hardcastle’s paper ‘Pleasure gone awry?’, it 
focuses on data about the neural mechanisms underlying chronic pain, 
acute pain, pleasure, and addiction, which Hardcastle uses to put pressure 
on these folk categories.  In particular, she claims there are important 
similarities between the neural substrates of chronic pain and alcoholism, 
and argues that both can be understood in terms of the malfunctioning of 
our pleasure system.  On this basis, she recommends that chronic pain and 
addiction be regarded as “of a conceptual piece.”  She argues, moreover, 
that these similarities have implications for how we think of acute pain 
too, especially its relationship to pleasure (in particular, the pleasure of 
relief from pain) and whether pain should be considered an evaluative 
state. 
 Richard Gray’s paper concerns the relationship between pain, 
pleasure, and perception.  He focuses particularly on pain, conceding that 
pain is subserved by its own physiological system, but rejecting both the 
perceptualist view that pains are perceptual representations of actual or 
threatened damage (§3.2 above) and the idea that pain is itself a sense 
modality (§4.1 above).  Yet Gray thinks pain is nonetheless related to 
perception, and in an interesting way.  Pains, he claims, represent the 
significance for us of the excessive stimulation of the sense organs of the 
modalities.  This is his updated version of the ‘intensive theory’.  This 
view, he argues, handles transient pains (pains that occur when damage is 
imminent) better than perceptualist views; and it can also handle acute 
and chronic pains by deeming them deviant cases.  It also provides one 
reason for doubting that pleasure and pain are opposites, since it is 
implausible—he argues—that pleasure’s role is whatever would be the 
opposite of the role of pain just sketched.  
 In ‘Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation’, Matthew Fulkerson 
and Jonathan Cohen defend what they call ‘causal theories’ of pleasure 
and pain (which include functionalism and imperativism) from an 
objection made by evaluativists (§3.4 above).15 The objection is that only 
evaluativist theories, not causal theories, can capture affective states’ 
rationalising role (§3.1 above).  Cohen and Fulkerson argue that this 
objection turns on two substantive and controversial but so far 
undefended views: a kind of internalism about justification and a form of 
motivational internalism about practical reasons (§3.1 above). They 
contend that, at the very least, we should require defence of these 
controversial presuppositions before we accept the evaluativists' argument 
against causal theories.  Finally, they identify a tension between some 
evaluativists' aspiration to give a naturalistic account of evaluative 
contents, on the one hand, and their idea that ‘mere causes’ cannot 
rationalise, on the other 
Turning to Murat Aydede’s paper, ‘How to Unify Theories  of 
Sensory Pleasure:  an Adverbialist Proposal’, it targets two traditional 
approaches to pleasures: felt-quality views (§3.1 above) and attitudinal 
views (§3.3 and §4.2, above).  On the former, pleasures share an 
introspectible common quality in virtue of which they count as pleasures. 
On the latter, pleasure is a composite of an experience plus an attitude – 
such as liking or desiring – taken towards that experience.  About each, 
Aydede makes a negative and positive point.  He rejects those versions of 
felt-quality views that claim pleasures share an introspectible sensory 
quality; but he accepts that pleasantness has an “occurrent 
phenomenology”.  Regarding attitudinal views, he rejects that 
pleasantness consists in having a pro- attitude, such as desire or liking, 
directed at your experience; but he accepts what he sees as a related idea, 
namely that an experience’s pleasantness consists in its having a desire-
like functional role.  As Aydede puts it, pleasantness is an adverbial 
matter (§3.2 above), a matter of the way incoming sensory information is 
processed.  And he extends this conclusion to unpleasantness too.  In sum, 
possession of the right desire-like role,  Aydede thinks, constitutes the 
                                                          
15 Cohen and Fulkerson say ‘evaluationist’, but for reasons of editorial consistency 
we have used ‘evaluativist.’  
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experience’s affective phenomenology; and while this phenomenology is 
non-sensory, it is phenomenology all the same (§3.3 above). 
 Finally, in ‘The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain 
to Well-Being’, Adam Shriver aims to refute the standard assumption in 
ethics and value theory that pleasure and pain, while opposites, are 
symmetrical, hence that arguments about pleasure and its relation to the 
well-being necessarily tell us about pain and its relation to well-being.  
Shriver claims that current neuroscience undermines this assumption. He 
maintains that experiences of pleasure and pain are mediated by different 
cognitive systems, argues that pleasure and pain stand in different 
relations to our motivational systems (see §4.3 above), and marshals 
evidence to the effect that, as he puts, “bad is stronger than good”.  
Pleasure and pain, he concludes, are not symmetrical.   
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